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By Alvin H. Hansen
Wesley Mitchell began his work with elan and buoyant enthusi-
asm. Three volumes, each a product of prodigious research and
bearing evidence of expert knowledge of source materials not
ily accessible, appeared at intervals of five years, 1903, 1908, and
1913. The first volume, A History of the Greenbacks, brought him
widespread recognition; the last, Business Cycles, made him
famous. The intermediate volume on Gold, Prices, and Wages
under the Greenback Standard was a bridge between the other
two. Taking the three together he had acquired, and in turn given
to the public, a vast knowledge of the fluctuations of the American
economy over a span of fifty years.
In these younger years he had the joy and thrill of the explorer
of new territory. Like Lewis and Clarke, taking measurements and
making notes of a vast unknown continent, so Mitchell was busy
uncovering a "new world" in American economics. It was not a
static survey of resources and industries; it was a motion picture
of the economy in motiOn. What interested Mitchell above all was
what happens to a society under conditions of rapid change and
fluctuations. His index numbers and chai-ts showed an economic
society in action—a dynamic, moving, changing society. Mitchell
was interested to discover the sequences of economic life in a proc-
ess of rapid change. And as each new conquest of data disclosed—
chart piled upon chart—the interrelated movements, the never
ceasing fluctuations, it began to dawn on him that the most essen-
tial characteristic of economic life is its dynamic quality. The sub-
ject matter of economics sprang to life. To be an economist—his
kind of an econOmist at any rate—was an exciting adventure.
The researches which ended in the publication of the 1913
*Originallypublished under the title "Wesley Mitchell, Social Scientist and
Social Counselor," Review of Economics and Statistics) November 1949. Here
reprinted, with only minor changes, by permission of the author and publisher.
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volume on Business Cycles had as their starting point the explosive
upheaval of the Civil War with its massive, tidal waves of inflation
and deflation. But this upheaval was followed by a long period of
rather moderate undulating waves which at times, to be sure, shot
up to pretty high peaks and fell into deep troughs. No sooner were
these researches, covering, half a century of American history,
ended than World War I broke out. Throughout the remainder
of Mitchell's lifetime, fairly stable conditions prevailed for only
one brief decade—the decade of the twenties. For the rest there
were two world engulfing wars which dealt smashing blows (the
effects of which we cannot yet appraise) upon the economic struc-
tures and institutions of western Europe, and in less, but still im-
pressive measure, upon the United States; and, in between, a world
depression 'of unprecedented severity and duration.
•Mitchell had trained himself to study an' economy in motion.
But he had increasingly come to regard its dynamic quality in terms
of recurring wavelike movements of relatively moderate ampli-
tude. The term "business cycle" became a popular and agreeable
concept. Businessmen found it no reproach to describe the system
of free enterprise as moving, in continuing, and self-generating
cycles. Rather, they regarded these oscillations as the "heart throb"
of a lively, dynamic system. The business cycle became a fad with
the business community; forecasting became a national sport, for
a time even more interesting than the game. of national politics.
The thirty-five years of Mitchell's work from 1913 to 1948 may
be divided into two equal parts. The first seventeen or eighteen
• years repeated (if we may be permitted a very rough comparison)
the Greenback episode and its aftermath. First came the war up-
heaval of prices, the short postwar restocking boom, a short but
sharp depression, and then a plateau of high prosperity and em-
ployment with mild oscillations. These were exciting developments,
and Mitchell, more than any other living economist, had prepared'
himself to understand them. Eagerly he plunged into the adven-
tures in economic explorations and public policy to which this flow
of events forcefully directed attention. First came his studies on
index numbers and prices during the war years, and then, begin-
fling in 1920, the vast program of empirical research by the Na-
tional Bureau of Economic Research of which he became Director.SOCIAL SCIENTIST AND SOCIAL COUNSELOR303
Advances in technology, with intermittent surges of innovations
and capital formation, never played important roles in Mitchell's
concept of the business cycle. Moreover, it is not easy to fit into his
scheme the titanic upheavals of two great wars and the devastating
collapse of the Great Depression. For him, business cycles were
essentially oscillations or fluctuations. The recurrent phases of eco-
nomic activity "grow out of and grow into each other." In his
1913 volume he declared that a theory of business cycles must be
a "descriptive analysis of the cumulative changes by which one
set of business conditions transforms itself into another set." The
inner processes of business are quite competent to develop from
one phase of the cycle into another without the adventitious help
of any "disturbing circumstance." Mitchell thus conceived it to
be the essential task of business cycle analysis to loOk for the regu-
lar sequences, to discover the leads and lags of the significant
economic variables, to trace the "processes of cumulative change."
The thesis that each phase of the cycle is generated out of the
preceding stage, that it is not dependent upon exogenous factors
external to the system of business itself, such as the intermittent,
or perhaps steady, progress of technology, the growth of popula-
tion, wars, harvests, autonomous monetary developments, or other
outside impulses, is an hypothesis which Mitchell advanced, but
which he found it no simple matter to prove by his empirical data.
The cumulative self-generating process can easily be made to
• satisfy the test in the periods of expansion and contraction. Diffi-
are encountered, however (and Mitchell struggled with
them), at the turning points. Exogenous factors he did in fact call
to aid; for example, new products, new processes, and the increase
in population at the lower turning point. But it is especially with
respect to the upper turning point (as a careful reading of Business
Cycles will disclose) that the self-perpetuating process stood in
need of more explanation than was offered by a recital of the
sequence of events.
Nevertheless, the conception of the cycle as a self-generating
movement growing out of the quiet inner processes ofbusiness
system itself was an interesting and fruitful hypothesis, and it had
a profound effect upon economic thinking all over the world. The
conception 'was forcefully and skilfully stated; it was woven intoI
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the description of the sequence of events with endless variation;
and it was driven home by constant reiteration. No one ever
thought of depressions and prosperity in quite the same way again,
it is safe to say, after reading Mitchell's Business Cycles.
The 1913 volume took business cycles out of the ivory tower
and made it the "stock-in-trade" of every financial writer and
businessman. It was phrased in the language of the market place.
The man of affairs at once recognized that here at last was a com-
petent account of what goes on in actual economic life. And for
the professional economist all discussion of "crises" became at long
last obsolete. The concept of the "cycle" had indeed been advanced
long before by many, but it was nonetheless Mitchell who "put it
over." Henceforth the phenomenon to be studied was the cycle,
an unfolding integrated movement which had to be looked at as
a whole.
This then is the story as Mitchell saw it in 1913. He had de-
scribed a sequence of events, leads and lags in different variables,
a process of cost-price-profit adjustment. There is always the infer-
ence that somehow this sequence of events, these leads and lags,
explain the cycle. Yet it is surely truer to say that whenever a
cyclical movement occurs, it unfolds in the manner of these leads
and lags. The driving forces back of the cycle movement, Mitchell
was never able to disclose.
Yet major contributions toward an understanding of thedriv-
ing forces had already been made by 1913 when Mitchell wrote
his Business Cycles. Indeed, as a short general statement, one can
say that the main foundations1 upon which the modern theory of
business cycles has been erected had been in the making since the
turn of the century (1) by Wicksell in his Geldzins und Güterpreise
(1898), (2) by Tugan-Baranowsky in his Studien zur Theorie
und Geschichte der Handelskrisen in England (1901), (3) by
Arthur Spiethoff in a series of articles appearing in Jahrbuch
für Gesetzgebung (1902-1903), (4) by Aftallon in the Revue
d'Economie Politique (1909) and later (1913) in his Les Crises
Périodiques de Surproduction, and (5) by Schumpeter in Theorie
der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung (1912). But Mitchell had not
For a discussion of the Continental Investment School, see my Business-Cycle
Theory (1927), Ch. IV, and Business Cycles and National Income (1951).SOCIAL SCIENTIST AND SOCIAL COUNSELOR305
absorbed their thinking and made it a part of his mental furni-
ture. Wicksell is not mentioned in the 1913 volume; Tugan-
Baranowsky is referred to in a footnote dealing with statistical
data only; Spiethoff is indeed discussed, but his essential and
vitally significant contribution (relating to the factors determining
investment outlets) is not recognized; Aftalion's theory of dimin-
ishing utilities is discussed, but his oscillation analysis (based on
the acceleration principle and the period of gestation) is not con-
sidered; and Schumpeter is not mentioned. Altogether these five
writers had made available prior to Mitchell's Business Cycles a
rich apparatus of business cycle analysis having to do with the rate
of investment, the saving-investment problem, the determinants
of investment demand, and the oscillatory mechanism inherent in
a production technique using capital goods,
Mitchell's apparent unawareness of the real significance of con-
tinental thinking on business cycles was no exception; it was gen-
eral throughout the English-speaking It may perhaps fairly
be said that (apart from Aftalion's work) its importance began to
dawn (imperfect though Cassel's version was) only after the ap-
pearance of the English translation of Gustav Cassel's Theory of
Social Economy in 1923. Indeed Keynes'. Treatise on Money, in
its business cycle sections, could be described as a belated effort
(in large part confused) to catch up with continental thinking,
particularly•asrepresented by Wicksell, Tugan-Baranowsky,
Spiethoff and Schumpeter. Finally, the General Theory of Em-
ployment, Interest and Money is the logical fruition of this stream
of thinking relating to investment, the determinants of investment,
and the role of investment in the process of income formation.
Ten years after the appearance of the monumental Business
Cycles, Mitchell made (in Business Cycles and Unemployment,
1923) a condensed, and in some respects improved, version of his
"rhythm of business activity." A careful rereading of this chapter
cannot fail, I feel, to instill admiration for a truly classic statement
of the thesis that business cycles consist of processes of cumulative
change which run regularly within the world of business itself.. One
new addition is made, an arithmetic exposition of the acceleration
principle, but it is not really integrated into his analysis. The self-306 ALVIN H. HANSEN
generating and cumulative process still rests upon a descriptive
account of the sequence of events. There is no real explanation.
The next landmark is Business Cycles: The Problem and Its
Setting (1927). Here the theoretical, historical, and statistical
literature is comprehensively canvassed. Sixty pages are devoted
to a survey of theoretical works. There is some recognition of the
continental development (especially Tugan-Baranowsky), but one
carries away strongly the feeling that the basic contributions of this
group of thinkers never fully registered on Mitchell's mind. At any
rate, there is no penetrating exposition of investment analysis,
together with a rigorous discussion leading to acceptance or rejec-
tion of the bold and impressive formulations of the Investment
School. Mitchell's panoramic survey of business cycle thedry, as
of the year 1927, gives one the impression that here is a vast, dis-
organized workshop in. which many workers have thrown their
tools about. The reader is unhappily not instructed which tools, if
any, are of workmanlike quality. Working hypotheses are indeed
needed, he tells us, to guide our selection of data and to suggest
ways of analyzing and combining them, and for this purpose he
seems to suggest that the theories, if they appear at all
plausible, serve almost equally well.
The survey of statistical findings and of business annals discloses
that the "normal" condition is a state of change, incessant fluctua-
tion. The fluctuations differ from cycle to cycle, but there is no
reason for doubting that these cycles constitute a valid species of
phenomena. In a world in which powerful and sporadic dis-
turbánces—wars, harvest variations, epidemics, floods, and earth-
quakes—come and go at irregular intervals, the "tendency toward
alternations of prosperity and depression must have considerable
constancy and energy to stamp its pattern upon economic history."
Similarly, there is the widest variation in random events from
nation to nation. Yet the quiet business forces working toward uni-
formity of fortunes must be powerful indeed to impress a "common
pattern upon the course of business cycles in many countries."
The conclusion to his 1927 volume suggests furtlier working
plans for the future. These include an effort to find "what features
have been characteristic of all or of most cycles." More must be
learned about the workings of the interrelated processes. After thisSOCIAL SCIENTIST AND SOCIAL COUNSELOR307
is done "it will be time to see what the question about the cause of
business cycles means, and in what sense it can be answered." Once
again there is the confident faith that the way to study cycles is to
study sequences, leads and lags, interrelations between different
variables with respect to timing, amplitude, deviations from a
critical range, etc. The conception of the problem remains as in
1913. The data accumulated and analyzed in the intervening four-
teen years had not altered this basic concept. And 'the time is, he
feels, not yet ripe to uncover the cause or causes of the phenome-
•non. The 1927 volume adds further to our detailed knowledge of
the sequence of events as the cycle unfolds, but we do not yet know
its innermost nature.
Ten years later (1937) appeared a notable publication of the
National Bureau of Economic Research—National Income and
Capital Formation, 1919-1935, by Simon Kuznets. It is indeed a
landmark in the of business cycles. Here is empirical
work of the highest significance. How many dark spaces and cor-
ners did it not illuminate? Here wásrich grist for Mitchell's mill
as he worked at the problem of causation. But one misses—or at
least I do—in anything he wrote subsequently, an adequate appre-
•ciation of. the significance for business cycle analysis of Kuznets'
data on income and capital formation. Kuznets' aggregates are, to
be sure, subjected (in Mitchell's What Happens during Business
Cycles). to the Bureau's standard measurements with respect to
amplitude, leads and lags, etc. Many competent workers 'will,
•however, question whether this represents all that could be learned
from Kuznets' rich, empirical study.
Long years of further research at'last 'came to light in the massive
Measuring Business Cycles by Burns and Mitchell. The volume is
mainly devoted to statistical methodology, but It also contains a
vast amount of data on the sequence of different time series in the
cycle. The title indicates that the "command" given in the 1927,
volume had been faithfully obeyed. The objective was not so much
explanation as measurement of the cycle behavior. Deviation of
movement,timing of peaks and troughs, duration of phases, ampli-
tudes, and rates of change are noted. "These measures together
with those showing the sequence in which different activities turn308 ALVIN H. HANSEN
up at business cycle revivals and turn down at busifless cycle reces-
sions are essential in tracing causal relations."
The authors conclude the volume, holding fast to the thesis (as
also in the 1927 volume) that a central core of stable features runs
through successive cycles. Secular or structural changes have left
little, if any, influence on cyclical behavior. Successive cycles of
the same series bear a family resemblance; the patterns of different
series are sharply differentiated, and the relations among the series
persist with great regularity from one cycle to the next. "This tend-
ency of individual series to behave similarly in regard to one
another in successive business cycles would not be foun4 if the
forces2 that produce business cycles had slight regularity." Thus
to the end Mitchell continued to be interested primarily in the
sequence of events. This sequence doubtless displays a certain regu-
larity from cycle to cycle, given fundamentally similar economic
institutions, but can this sequence disclose the "fOrces" that
"cause" the cycle?
Finally in his paper on "The Role of Research in Economic
Progress,"3 he refers to the widely different responses that a general
business expansion evokes from the different industries ranging all
the way from coal mining to farming. These different responses
cannot be ascribed to chance, since they recur, cycle after cycle,
with the same regularity as the general tides of business. Again he
suggests that leads and lags, differences in amplitude, the "rela-
tive importance of the leaders and laggards that fluctuate little or
muéh" are the all important problems for anyone "trying to under-
stand how business cycles come about." His unfinished "progress
report" on What Happens during Business Cycles is a comprehen-
sive study worked out along these lines.
Mitchell's strong emphasis throughout his life's work was on
research, knowledge, and understanding, not on practical policy.
Nevertheless, he held persistently the view that knowledge was to
be desired, not for the pure pleasure of acquiring it, but for the
purpose of putting it to practical use. In the final analysis, scien-
2Does"forces" mean impulses or conditio'ns in sense, or in what sense
is the term used?
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tific research in the social sciences was to be justified, he believed,
by its application to the problems of social and economic life.
The National Bureau of Economic Research, from its inception,
has aimed to be strictly a fact finding body and to refrain from
making pronouncements on public policy. In conformity with this
principle, at the invitation of Secretary of Commerce Herbert
Hoover, the Bureau undertook in 1923 an investigation into the
feasibility of various plans for mitigating or preventing unemploy-
ment. The result was the volume entitled Business Cycles and Un-
employment. It presented "not recommendations concerning what
ought to be done, but facts which .ought to be considered by those
who have the responsibility of formulating policies."
As an individual citizen, however, Mitchell voiced his own
positive views, not indeed in the report issued by the Bureau, but
in a chapter, "The of Controlling Business Cycles," pub-
lished within the same year (1923) in Edie's The Stabilization of
Business. Here he expressed the view, that "we have learned how
to prevent crises from degenerating into panics and from that suc-
cess we may derive substantial encouragement to attack the next
•problems: how to lessen the excesses of 'booms' and the sufferings
of depressions." He regarded it as notable that in the current dis-
cussions "emphasis is laid upon the prosperous phase of the cycle
•as the phase which requires control." It was becoming common
opinion, he said, that "the time for effective action. is the time
when industrial activity is approaching the elastic limit set by full
use of existing plant and.when further expansion will be primarily
a speculative boom." He cited the view of Governor Benjamin
Strong (with respect to the 1920 crisis) that "it would have been
desirable to raise rates before the boom began," his reason being
that "an advance of rates would have moderated the expansion
of business and thereby diminished the severity of the crisis of
1920." About this Mitchell commented as follows: "If Governor
Strong and the men who share his opinion are right[,] ... asI think
they are, may we not generalize and say it is desirable to raise
discount rates iii future periods of expansion, whenever signslap-
pear that production is nearing its limit?"4 He thallenged Mr. A.
C. Miller's view that the "reserve ratio should continue indefinitely
'Edie, The Stabilization of Business, p.39.
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to be the guide to credit policy....Weshould aim at gaining a
far more effective control over the wastes of prosperity and the
sufferings of depression than the Bank of England has ever exer-
cised." And if the "business 'public is unprepared" fOr a more
effective control we may not "treat that attitude as an insuperable
obstacle." If Mr. Miller, as a Federal Reserve official,. confines
himself to that which is immediately realizable, "as an economist,
he might join us in considering plans which involve campaigns
of education."5
To the objection that we cannot know the "precise point in the
prosperous phase of the business cycle at which it is desirable to
check expansion," Mitchell. replied that this objection "has been
met by the progress Of statistical research." He accepted Sprague's
suggestion to use "index numbers of physical production such as
have been made recently by Day, King, Snyder, and Stewart."6
These series showed, he declared, a rapid rise in output in the first
phase of expansion. Thereafter it slows down. "After this point has
been reached in the cycle a further rise of prices serves not to in-
crease the current supply of serviceable goods, but to create confu-
sion in the markets.....Ouraim, accordingly, should be to.check
the rise of prices when the index numbers of physical output
indicate that the limit of existing capacity is being approached."7
Mitchell did not expect "that any plans relating simply to bank-
ing practice will give us as large a measure of control over the
business cycle as we desire and can attain." Certain other "plans
of control" merit attention. Among these he includes "long-range
planning of public works." In this connection he cited the pro-
posals of Bowley and the Webbs in England and Otto T. Mallery
in the United States. He referred to a Senate bill for the planning
of federal public works. "It, too, requires a campaign of 'public
education. And no one can tell in advance just what practical
importance it may assume. But clearly the average annual volume
of construction work now undertaken by various public bodies.
runs high in the hundreds of millions, and a considerable fraction
of this imposing total can be allocated on the basis of the business
cycle without detriment to social welfare."8 He was urging a mod-
6Ibid., p.42. Ibid. Ibid.,p.43. 8lbid., p.45.SOCIAL SCIENTIST AND SOCIAL COUNSELOR311
crate program of ironing out over the cycle the regular outlays on
'public works. This, of course, is not to be confused with modern
fiscal policy proposals involving the deliberate use of variation in
taxes and expenditures on a broad scale as a systematic anticyclical
program.
Mitchell also went on record, at this early date, when such pro-
posals were still regarded as advanced if indeed not as radical, for
the "various schemes of unemployment insurance now in opera-
tion or under consideration by government agencies and private
employers."9
He concludes with a plea for "the need of increasing our knowl-
edge of the business cycle and putting this knowledge to better
use," and expresses "an optimistic view of the future. For since
• the money economy is a complex of human institutions, it is sub-
ject to amendment. What we have to do is to find out just how
the rules of our own making thwart our wishes and to change them
in detail or change them drastically as the case mayrequire." And
this task is not easy. "On the contrary, the work of analysis is diffi-
cult intellectually and the work of devising remedies and putting
them into effect is harder still. But one has slender confidence in
the vitality of the race and in the power of scientific method if he
thinks a task of this technical sort is beyond man's power."°
Ten years later, Mitchell joined with ten economists and, engi-
neers in the Report of the Columbia University Commission on
Economic Reconstruction, published in February 1934. This was
a forward looking document which on balance (though critical of
the restrictionist, aspects of the NRA and the AAA and of the War-
ren type of monetary manipulation) was sympathetic to the New
Deal outlook. Specifically, the Report favdred "a large and well-
timed program of public works. The most serious objection to this
antideflationary measure is removed by the fact that the country
is not at present tied to the gold standard." It was suggested that
"funds for financing enlarged public works programs can be raised
by creating new bank credits." The Report went well beyond
the ordinary public works projects. "Schemes for skim clearance,
Ibid., p. 46. '°Ibid., pp. 52-53.
EconomicReconstruction: Report of the Columbia Uniuersity Commission,
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the erection of decent workers' dwellings, and city planning proj-
ects suffer from the defect that in most. cities comprehensive and
detailed plans have not existed hitherto, but they offer almost
boundless opportunities in the future for construction work of the
highest social utility. For this reason prime importance should not
be attached to the 'self-liquidating' 'character of projects to be
undertaken. On the cOntrary, since the object of such expenditures
is to increase the total volume 'of purchasing power, the choice of
projects should be determined by their social utility rather than by
the prospect of a specific income yield accruing from the services
to which the projects are devoted."2
A reflation of the domestic price level was favored "in response
to internal business developments and the stimulation of govern-
ment expenditures, not as a result of inflationary manipulation of
the currency." The Report maintained, moreover, a forward look-
ing attitude with respect to international monetary arrangements.
With respect to the principle of economic planning, the Report
was emphatic. "We regard economic planning as a rational and
in fact a necessary expedient under the conditions of our present
society." And to that end it was recommended "that a National
Social-Economic Council, of a purely advisory nature, should be
set up and equipped with adequate facilities for research, for the
purpose of continuous and concentrated investigation of the main
problems of economic planning and withthe duty of recommend-
ing to the President and Congress. such measures as in its judgment
would contribute to the balanced economic development of the
country."
Certain members of the Commission felt it necessary to write
brief dissents with respect to specific points covered in the Report.
Mitchell did not feel it necessary to do so. He did write a charming
and characteristic supplementary statement in which he said that
the Report "states more effectively than any other document
known to me what I take to be the basic economic problem that
now confronts mankind—the problem of developing an economic
organization that will enable the citizens of a modern state to buy
from one another what modern industrial methods enable them to
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produce." If progress is to be achieved, he declared, "men who
have had the privilege of studying the social sciences must be ready
at any time to contribute what in them lies to the agelongprocess
of bettering economic organization by taking thought, however
little chance they have of being right at all points." He declared
himself in "full accord" with the "constructive spirit" of the Re-
port, and closed with a statement which reflects at once an innate
modesty, a healthy agnosticism, but withal a faith that progressive
pioneering in the adjustment of economic institutions to the re-
qüirements of a changing world deserves support. The statement
follows: "Realizing keenly the fallibility of any opinions I can form
regarding the best ways of dealing with the intricate problems
discussed, I attach no great importance to my doubts concerning
certain of the views expressed. Believing that the opinions of my
colleagues on the committee are similarly fallible, I commend
heartily those passages in the report that stress the need of more
penetrating studies of social processes."13
Some three years later Mitchell was honored by Harvard Uni-
versity on the occasion of the Tercentenary Celebration in 1936.
At a symposium participated in by D. H. 'Robertson, D. B. Cop-
land, and others, Mitchell delivered a paper on "Intelligence and
the Guidance of Economic Evolution." In particular, he addressed
himself to the problem of economic planning. He referred to
American policy from the outset as "an unstable mixture of na-
tional planning and reliance on the play of private enterprise....
The first Secretary of the Treasury under the Constitution plunged
at once into national economic planning and scored a series of
notable successes. ...Earlyin our history we sought to develop a
national transportation system of highways and waterways; later
we put our trust in privately owned railroads, to which we made
lavish grants of public lands; later still we subjected the railroads
to a complex set of state and federal regulations. ...Welagged be-
hind European countries in social legislation and in governmental
ownership of public utilities, but we led in efforts to check the
growth of monopolies and to compel businessmen to compete with
one another." More and more "our individualism has expressed
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itself in efforts to use the government as an agency for attaining
what we severally desire."
"This secular trend and more varied economic
planning .. wassuddenly and enormously stimulated by the,
World War." And while most of the wartime controls were re-
leased after the return of peace, there was no such trend toward
laissez faire as followed the Napoleonic Wars. Finally "the grave,
economic errors perpetrated by private economic planning during
the 1920's combined with the after-effects of the War to bring on
the Great Depression of the early 1930's, and with it a marked
recrudescence of national planning....Inthe United States, dis-
couraged by three ,yearsof ineffectual efforts to stem the growth
of unemployment by an administration that believed in 'rugged
individualism,' the electorate put in power a party whose leader
pràmised a New Deal in economic affairs."14
"To my mind, this cursory survey of the relations between the
state and economic enterprise in the western world since 1776
suggests that we are in for more rather than for less governmental
planning in the calculable future....Itscourse will be diversified
by accelerations and retardations, perhaps by some vigorous reac-
tions toward laissez faire. But the indications seem to me fairly
clear that in the long run men will try increasingly to use the power
and resources. of their governments to solve their economic prob-
lems even in those nations that escape social revolutions. . .Our
choice does not lie between two sharply contrasted systems, private
enterprise and governmental regulation; the real choices that we
shall be making more or less deliberately are choices among the
indefinitely numerous possible 'mixtures of private enterprise and
governmental regulation, as applied to this, that, or the other type
of activity, under different conditions of time and place."5
In view of this growing tendency, Mitchell favored the estab-.
lishing of a national planning organization "charged to study the
collateral and the long-run effects of public policies."16 Such a
14 andthe Individual (Harvard Tercentenary Publications), pp.
22-24.
Ibid., pp. 24, 26-27.
'°The National Planning Board, of which Mitchell was a member (the other
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National Planning Board would be "the best safeguard against
ill-considered measures." A systematic and continuing study of
national problems by such a federal agency would not necessarily
accelerate the trend toward governmental regulation. "It might
have the opposite effect." Such an agency would find its technical
tasks exceedingly difficult. Experienced men "know how hard it is
to foresee the indirect and cumulative consequences of public poli-
cies, to approximate social gains and social costs, to find the most
efficient ways of accomplishing given ends. And the ends to be
aimed at are not given; they must be chosen:...Ina democratic
country, national planners would have to serve as an agency for
accomplishing what the majority desired."7 The proposal which
Mitchell here made seems to bear close resemblance to the Council
of Economic Advisers set up by the Employment Act of 1946.
Mitchell's next important pronouncement on public policy was
made in an address in 1940 at the University of Pennsylvania Bi-
centennial Conference.18 Among other matters he discusses the
problem of employment. "This inability to buy from one another
what we know how to produce and what we need to consume is
the fundamental reason why we have cyclical depressions. But the
reason is itself a riddle. Business cannot produce because people
cannot buy; people cannot buy because business cannot pay wages,
dividends, interest, and rents without turning profits into losses.
At present the rate of operation of every business enterprise
depends upon the rates at which other enterprises operate—those
which produce the goods jt needs, those which do its hauling, and
those which buy from it."19 The problem is posed exclusively in
terms of an exchange of goods between producers. There is no rec-
ognition or grappling with the problem of investment and saving.
q
"Therub is that we do not know just how to overcome the
defects we recognize without running grave risk of creating worse
• troubles. Logic suggests that complete nationalization of produc-
Report (1934) on planning divided into four sections as follows: Section I.
Planning Activities; Section II. A Plan for Planning; Section HI. Science in
Planning; and Section IV. National Planning.
Authority and the Individual, pp.' 34-36.
Studiesin Economics and Industrial Relations. Ibid., p. 10.
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tion under the management of the ablest engineers might make
every enterprise an internally efficient unit adjusted perfectly to
the other units in a systematically-planned series of operations.
But experience raises awkward questions about this vision.
Most of us answer questions of this sort out of the abundance of
our feelings. None of us is able to answer them out of the fullness
of knowledge. This ignorance may be a good reason for postpon-
ing radical changes until we know more; but it is a bad reason
for resting content with a system characterized by wastes and
friction."20
•"Only in great emergencies do we mobilize our industries under
the direction of a general staff. Our reasons for putting up with
such a rudimentary organization are doubtkss sound; but they
are based upon lack of knowledge. We do not know how to com-
bine full use of our engineering skill with our reliance upon corn-
petition to protect the consumer from
In all this Mitchell appears to be looking for a solution along the
lines of organization of industry. Monetary and fiscal policies, as
possible stabilizing and expansionist factors operating upon a
mixed society, largely private enterprise, are not examined.
Mitchell ends his discussion urging once again that "more energy
be put into cultivating social sciences of a type that can be applied
to practical affairs." Social inventions show a lag behind techno-
logical inventions. The social engineer cannot "perfect his schemes
by methodical experiments." The social inventor "must persuade
administrative officials, or legislators, or even a majority of voters
that his innovation is worth all the trouble, expense, and confusion
incident to a change in established practices. At worst he must
wage a 'campaign of education' on a wide front over a long time.
And whatever obstacles have to be surmounted are almost certain
to be made more formidable by opposition from groups whose
interests are menaced by the proposed change."22
"On the basis of this analysis I venture to urge a practical con-
clusion concerning social policy. If our inability to employ our
other resources to the best advantage is due largely to maladjust-
ments among economic processes, and if economics is now applying
20 Ibid., p. 11. 21Ibid.,pp.12-13. 14.SOCIAL SCIENTIST AND SOCIAL COUNSELOR317
methods that enable it to deal with actual conditions, then en-
lightened citizens and public men should do all they can to pro-
mote economic research. ... Forexample, the billions of dollars
this country would gain from a mitigation of cyclical contractions
justifies investing some millions in trying to find out how the flows
of products, incomes, and can be kept better balanced."23
In September 1944, Mitchell wrote four articles for the New
York Times in which he discussed the economic problems con-
fronting the United States once the war was over. In part they
were derived from his "Economic Research and the Needs of the
Times," the Twenty-fourth Annual Report of the National Bureau
of Economic Research.
During the first postwar years, he wrote, "Americans will con-
gratulate themselves upon the efficiency of an economic system
that passed the test of war with flying colors, reconverted itself to
peaceful conditions promptly, caught up war shortages at home
and helped foreign countries to get back on their feet. This indus-
trial accomplishment will show us at our best."24 Few, if indeed
any, have written a better forecast than that of the first postwar
years.
"The test that will be hard to pass will come after the extraordi-
nary postwar demands have been satisfied and our business settles
down to supplying the continuously recurring demands of a long
stretch of peace. Can we then maintain a high level of employment
year in, year out? Experience answers 'No.'...Unlesswe can
learn to manage our affairs more skilfully in the future, we must
look forward to an indefinite series of. cyclical depressions, some
relatively mild, some drastic." If ways are not devised, he went on
to say, of preventing, or at least ameliorating, cyclical depressions
without checking growth, "there seem to be reasons for expecting
that public opinion will become more critical than ever before of
our traditional form of economic organization and demand radical
changes."25 The reader will note that here again Mitchell appears
to discount (or at least he does not discuss) the possibilities of
measures less radical than a drastic change in our "economic
Ibid., pp. 16-17. 24New York Times., September 18, 1944.318 ALVIN 'H. HANSEN
organization." American Socialists, he says, have long argued for
a vigorous extension. of governmental control over economic activi-
ties, and now they can point to the "quite unexpected efficiency
of the Soviet economy....Thusone of the developments that
peace seems likely to bring the United States is a fierce controversy
over the fundamental character. of ecOnomic organization. No
doubt there will be sharp differences of opinion, about the precise
role to be assigned to Governmental planning even during the
transition from war to peace; but they promise to concern details
rather than fundamentals....Theall-out struggle will not come
until we have reverted to business as usual, practiced it buoyantly
during several years of active demand for goods, then succumbed
to severe depression."
"How can we operate a system of free enterprise without falling
every few years into a spasm of unemployment? For that problem
no nation has yet found a solution that does not involve the sup-
pression of free enterprise itself. We know ways of mitigating the
sufferings that unemployment brings, but we cannot rest content
with costly and partial cures. What we need to learn is how• to
prevent this recurrent disease of our body politic. The job is one
that calls for scientific research quite as truly as does the preven-
tion of cancer or infantile paralysis. To it the nation may wisely
devote resources matching those it devotes to the diseases that
afflict individuals."26
This was in 1944 and it was one of Mitchell's last pronounce-
ments on public policy.27 In the following years, 1945 and 1946,
he 'took no public position pro or con, as far as I can discover, on
the Murray Full Employment Bill or the Employment Act of
1946, though he had advocated, as we have seen, something similar
to this in his Harvard Tercentenary address. In a paper "The Role
of Research in Economic Progress" delivered on the occasion of•
the twenty-fifth anniversary of the Industrial Research Depart-
ment of the.University of Pennsylvania in 1947 he again stressed
20Ibid.
Mention should, however, be made of the Report of the Technical Committee
of which Mitchell was chairman, on Prices and the Cost of Living in Wartime,
issued June 15, 1944. The Technical Committee was appointed by the chair-
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the importance of gaining a "clearer insight into the characteristics
and workings of our economic organization." But as Mitchell deep-
ened his knowledge of that organization through a lifetime devoted
to research, and supplemented by the researches of a vast institute,
he seemed to become less and less certain of himself, less and less
ready to take a position in current controversial issues of public
policy, or indeed on the scientific controversies relating particu-
larly to his field of interest, namely, the vast issues raised by Keynes'
General Theory. In 1923, as we have seen, he felt pretty sure of
himself and was prepared to make positive recommendations.
Twenty years later, that was no longer the case. This is under-
standable, and perhaps almost a universal experience. The social
sciences appear to be so complex, that the more we know, the less
sure we are that what we know is tolerably reliable, especially for
policy decisions. All this raises disquieting thoughts—thoughts
which emerge from the very nature of the human problem. None-
theless, Mitchell clung to the end to his faith in knowledge,, in the
ultimate practical value of economic research. Indeed there is no
other alternative. Human life is unfolding in a rapidly moving
stream of events. Decisions have to: be made every day, and what-
ever the underlying forces, knowledge is a guide to action. Of one
thing we can be certain: There will be no moratorium on scientific
research, whether in the natural sciences or the social sciences. It.
is the nature of the human animal to wish to know, to enlarge his
knowledge of himself and of the universe. Whether this makes for
progress or not, or indeed what is meant by progress, is another
matter. ,
Onthis there is universal accord: Mitchell occupies a com-
manding place in the history of American economics. Not only
did he perform singlehanded, especially in his early years, pro-
digious researches which were veritable gold mines of information,
but he organized, inspired, and directed a great program of em-
pirical studies designed to prevent economists from running away
from their essential task—the task of understanding and guid-
ing our economic life, to serve human needs and human values.
Mitchell retained to the end his deep human and democratic sym-
pathies, his faith in mankind, his belief in progress. He was skepti-
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Hayek school or by fiscal planners of the Keynesian persuasion. He
believed in the individual, but also in the social responsibilities of
government. He was open-minded to new social ventures, but he
counseled moderation, taking time for careful thought. He recog-
nized that governments must act from day to day, but he believed
it to be his own special function, and also that of economics as a
science, to provide the surest possible foundation of knowledge
upon which to act. Thus, though practical policy decisions press
for immediate answers, he knew that those answers were never
final. And so he turned back again andagainto his study and to
planned programs of research.
.1